Beijing has sharply rejected a draft Pentagon assessment that China has likely loaded more than 100 new intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), accusing Washington of exaggerating the threat to justify its own nuclear modernization. The dispute, which surfaced days before Christmas 2025, highlights the growing mistrust at the heart of the U.S.–China strategic rivalry and raises questions about how close the world is edging toward a new three‑way nuclear arms race.

Image Illustration. Photo by Bo Peng on Unsplash

The Latest U.S. Claim: 100 New Chinese ICBMs Loaded

The immediate trigger for Beijing’s response was a draft report prepared for the U.S. Department of Defense, which assesses that China has “likely loaded more than 100 ICBMs” across newly built silo fields in northern China near the border with Mongolia. Reuters reported that the draft describes the buildup as evidence that China’s nuclear force is modernizing “faster than any other nuclear power.”

The new missiles are believed to be variants of the solid‑fuel DF‑31 family, road‑mobile systems that have been adapted for silo deployment and can strike targets across the continental United States when launched from deep inside Chinese territory. Analysts at the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists estimate that China is building roughly 320 new silos for solid‑fuel ICBMs across three major fields, plus around 30 additional silos for older liquid‑fuel DF‑5 missiles, in what they call the largest expansion of China’s nuclear arsenal in its history.

Beijing’s Response: Defensive Posture and Accusations of U.S. Hype

China’s Foreign Ministry swiftly rejected the U.S. characterisation. Spokesperson Lin Jian accused Washington of recycling a familiar playbook: inflating the Chinese threat to rationalize its own nuclear upgrades and maintain strategic dominance. In comments reported by Reuters after the draft emerged, Lin urged the U.S. — as the world’s largest nuclear power — to “take the lead” in reducing its arsenal instead of “hyping up” China’s capabilities.

Chinese officials routinely stress that Beijing adheres to a no‑first‑use doctrine for nuclear weapons and maintains its arsenal at what it calls the “minimum level” necessary for national security. In public statements, Beijing argues that U.S. missile defense deployments and advanced conventional strike systems threaten China’s ability to retaliate, forcing it to improve survivability rather than seek numerical parity with the United States or Russia.

How Big Is China’s Nuclear Arsenal Now?

Behind the war of words lies a rapidly changing nuclear balance. According to the Pentagon’s 2024 China Military Power Report, China possessed about 500 ICBM launchers — including both silo‑based and mobile systems — and roughly 400 ICBM missiles as of early 2024. The same report assessed that Beijing had around 500 operational nuclear warheads in 2023, more than double the “low‑200s” reported in 2020, and projected that number could exceed 1,000 by 2030.

Independent researchers largely corroborate the picture of rapid growth, though often with more caution about how many new silos actually contain missiles. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimated in mid‑2025 that China had at least 600 nuclear warheads and was adding roughly 100 warheads per year — the fastest rate of any nuclear‑armed state.

By contrast, the United States still fields a far larger nuclear inventory, with about 5,200 warheads in its stockpile as of early 2024, according to open‑source tallies based on U.S. government data compiled by the Federation of American Scientists. Even if Chinese warhead numbers reach 1,500 by 2035, as some projections suggest, Beijing would still trail Washington and Moscow in deployed capabilities.

Silo Fields and the ‘100 ICBMs’ Question

At the heart of the current dispute is a technical question: how many of China’s new silos are actually loaded with missiles? Satellite imagery analysed by independent experts has identified three massive new silo fields in Yumen, Hami and Yulin, each laid out in a triangular grid and located far inland, beyond the reach of U.S. cruise missiles. Research published by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in 2025 concludes that China is constructing around 350 new ICBM silos in total — 320 for solid‑fuel systems plus 30 for DF‑5 missiles — an expansion that exceeds Russia’s entire silo‑based ICBM force and represents roughly three‑quarters of the U.S. silo force.

However, whether more than 100 of those silos are already filled with operational missiles remains disputed. A 2023 analysis by the Federation of American Scientists questioned earlier Pentagon claims that China had already surpassed the U.S. in ICBM launchers, noting that construction and support infrastructure at the new fields were still ongoing and that there was no public evidence yet of large‑scale missile loading.

Arms Race Fears: U.S. and China Point Fingers

The U.S. warning about more than 100 newly loaded Chinese ICBMs comes as Washington pours hundreds of billions of dollars into modernizing its own nuclear triad. The Congressional Budget Office projects that U.S. nuclear forces will cost about $946 billion between 2025 and 2034 — a 25% jump from its previous estimate — driven by programs such as the Sentinel ICBM, Columbia‑class submarines and B‑21 bombers. The figure was detailed in an April 2025 CBO report on nuclear force costs, underscoring the scale of U.S. investment even as it urges China to show restraint.

Chinese officials routinely point to those U.S. plans — and to the absence of legally binding limits after the erosion of Cold War‑era arms‑control treaties — as proof that Washington is in no position to lecture others. Beijing has so far resisted U.S. calls for trilateral arms‑control talks with Russia, arguing that its arsenal is far smaller and that the onus remains on Washington and Moscow to cut their stockpiles first.

Strategic Stability at Risk

For arms‑control experts, the immediate question is not just how many Chinese silos are filled, but how U.S. and Chinese leaders interpret one another’s intentions. A move from a relatively small, secure Chinese deterrent toward a larger, silo‑heavy force could increase both sides’ incentive to strike first in a crisis if they fear that new systems are vulnerable to pre‑emption or miscalculation.

China’s expansion is unfolding just as the last remaining U.S.–Russia strategic arms treaty, New START, approaches expiration in 2026 with no replacement in sight. Without new constraints, the United States could face what officials have termed “the unprecedented challenge” of simultaneously deterring two near‑peer nuclear competitors. That prospect has already prompted Pentagon planners to re‑examine assumptions about warhead numbers, targeting and missile defense — decisions that, in turn, feed Beijing’s sense of encirclement.

Conclusion: A Numbers Dispute with Global Stakes

Whether China has loaded 50, 100 or 200 new ICBMs into its burgeoning silo fields, the political impact of the U.S. claim and Beijing’s rebuttal may matter more than the exact number. The Pentagon’s warning reinforces a narrative in Washington that China is racing toward strategic parity and that U.S. forces must expand or at least fully modernize in response. In Beijing, officials frame the same data as proof that the United States is using fear of China to preserve nuclear primacy while ignoring its own disarmament obligations.

For the rest of the world, the exchange is another reminder that the nuclear order built around U.S.–Russia parity is straining under the weight of a fast‑rising third power. As evidence mounts of rapid silo construction, growing warhead stockpiles and mutual suspicion, the space for arms control is shrinking. Unless Washington and Beijing can begin to talk not only about accusations and numbers, but about mutual limits and rules of the game, the argument over “100 ICBMs” may be remembered as just one early marker on the road to a more dangerous, less predictable nuclear era.