A single remark from a senior security official in Japan’s Prime Minister’s Office — that Japan “should have nuclear weapons” — has ignited a fierce war of words with Beijing and thrust Asia’s longstanding nuclear anxieties back into the spotlight.
While Tokyo has formally reiterated that its policy of not possessing nuclear arms remains unchanged, the episode underscores how fast the strategic ground is shifting in Northeast Asia, where China is rapidly expanding its arsenal, North Korea openly wields nuclear threats and U.S. extended deterrence faces growing skepticism.
The immediate trigger came in mid‑December, when Japanese media reported that a senior official advising Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi on security had told reporters that, given the deteriorating threat environment, “Japan should have nuclear weapons,” framing the comment as a personal opinion.
Days later, Japan’s defense minister refused to rule out revisiting the country’s long‑standing “three non‑nuclear principles” — not possessing, not producing and not allowing the introduction of nuclear weapons — saying that “all options would be discussed”. That nuance was enough to set off alarm bells in Beijing and beyond.
China’s Foreign Ministry responded with unusually sharp language. Spokesperson Lin Jian said Beijing was “shocked” by the statement, calling it a “blatant challenge” to the post‑war order and to the global nuclear non‑proliferation regime, and urged the international community to be “on high alert.” Beijing warned that if Japan continues to “push the envelope,” China’s response will be a firm “no,” without specifying what concrete measures might follow.
Facing domestic criticism and international scrutiny, Chief Cabinet Secretary Minoru Kihara moved quickly to reaffirm Japan’s long‑standing posture. Tokyo remains committed to the “three non‑nuclear principles” and to its obligations under the Treaty on the Non‑Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non‑nuclear‑weapon state. According to reporting from Reuters, the government stressed that its nuclear policy “has not changed,” even as opposition parties demanded the official’s removal.
Japan’s constitution, particularly Article 9, renounces war and the maintenance of “war potential,” and post‑war public opinion has consistently leaned toward pacifism. An NHK survey cited by constitutional scholars has repeatedly found that less than one‑quarter of Japanese voters support revising Article 9, while a much larger share sees it as the “most important” part of the country’s pacifist identity.
Yet public anxiety is rising. North Korea’s accelerating missile and nuclear programs, Russia’s war in Ukraine and continued friction in the East and South China Seas have all fueled debate about whether Japan can rely indefinitely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Some lawmakers in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party have floated ideas such as hosting U.S. nuclear weapons on Japanese soil under a NATO‑style “nuclear sharing” arrangement, an idea that remains deeply controversial at home and abroad.
Beijing’s fierce reaction must be seen against the backdrop of its own expanding nuclear forces and its fraught historical relationship with Tokyo. China today holds the world’s third‑largest nuclear arsenal. Independent estimates by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and the Federation of American Scientists put China’s stockpile at roughly 600 operational warheads as of 2025, more than double the estimated number in 2019.
A recent U.S. Defense Department assessment projected that Beijing could field between 750 and 1,500 warheads by 2035, amid construction of hundreds of new missile silos in western China. Though China maintains a declared “no‑first‑use” nuclear policy, the scale and speed of its buildup has unsettled neighbors and U.S. planners alike.
In its December 22 briefing, China’s Foreign Ministry went beyond procedural protest. It accused “right‑wing forces” in Japan of seeking “remilitarization,” noted that Japan has accumulated large stocks of plutonium and warned that allowing Tokyo to acquire “powerful offensive weapons, or even nuclear weapons, will again bring disaster to the world,” according to the official transcript published by the ministry. The historical reference was unmistakable: Chinese officials frequently invoke Japan’s wartime aggression to oppose any expansion of its military role today.
China and other critics often point to Japan’s civilian plutonium stockpile as evidence of a “latent” nuclear capability. As of late 2024, Japan possessed about 44.4 metric tons of separated plutonium stored domestically and in facilities in the United Kingdom and France, according to figures cited by the Kyodo news agency and other outlets. Nuclear experts note that, in theory, this quantity would be enough for several thousand nuclear warheads if diverted to military use.
Tokyo insists that all of this material is earmarked for civilian purposes, including fuel for nuclear power reactors and research. The Japan Atomic Energy Agency recently reported an R&D plutonium stockpile of roughly 3.6 tons at the end of fiscal 2024, subject to safeguards under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Japan emphasizes that it adheres strictly to IAEA verification and NPT restrictions on nuclear material use.
Still, the technical reality is that Japan remains one of the world’s most advanced nuclear‑energy states, with sophisticated space, missile and industrial bases. Many analysts argue that if Tokyo were ever to make the political decision to pursue nuclear weapons, it could assemble a small arsenal relatively quickly — a scenario that amplifies the stakes of today’s rhetoric even if it remains far from policy.
Japan’s nuclear debate does not occur in a vacuum. To its north, North Korea is believed to possess around 50–60 nuclear warheads and continues to test missiles capable of striking Japan. State media in Pyongyang seized on the recent Japanese remarks, warning through the KCNA news agency that Tokyo’s “ambition for nuclear weapons should be thoroughly curbed,” framing Japan’s debate as a direct response to U.S.–South Korean military cooperation.
The United States, meanwhile, maintains roughly 3,700 nuclear warheads in its stockpile, of which about 1,770 are deployed, and extends its deterrent to both Japan and South Korea. Yet political turbulence in Washington and speculation about future U.S. commitments have prompted officials in Tokyo and Seoul to quietly re‑examine worst‑case scenarios — including what might happen if the U.S. nuclear umbrella were perceived to weaken.
For now, there is no indication that Japan is preparing to cross the nuclear threshold. Legal, political and moral barriers remain high in the only country ever to suffer atomic bombings. Polls continue to show deep public resistance to acquiring nuclear weapons, and any move in that direction would likely trigger intense backlash from neighbors, U.S. allies and the broader international community.
Yet the latest flare‑up illustrates how quickly the nuclear question can re‑emerge in a region where great‑power rivalry is intensifying and arms control frameworks are fraying. As China rapidly enlarges its arsenal, North Korea brandishes its own, and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine reshapes global threat perceptions, strategic debates in Tokyo will only become sharper — and statements once dismissed as “personal views” may be read abroad as signals of things to come.
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